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Implementing Family Unification Rights
in American Immigration Law: Proposed
Amendments
JOHN GUENDELSBERGER*
There is something wrong with a law that keeps out - for as long as eight
years - the small child of a mother or father who has settled in the United
States while a nonrelative or less close relative from another country can
come in immediately."
This Article examines the provisions of American immigration law
that impede the entry of immediate family members of permanent
resident aliens. It focuses particularly on the numerical limitations
- the annual ceiling and the per-country ceiling on preference cate-
gory visas - which force applicants from countries of high immigra-
tion demand to wait for long periods of time before visas become
available. As a result, spouses and minor children of some perma-
nent resident aliens enter immediately, while those from countries
like Mexico or the Philippines must wait as long as eight years.' The
inequities are exacerbated by the recently passed Immigration Re-
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law. B.A.
1973, J.D. 1977, Ohio State University; D.E.A. 1986, University of Paris I (Pantheon-
Sorbonne); LL.M. 1987, Columbia University.
1. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FINAL RE-
PORT AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 15 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP]. See also
Guendelsberger, The Right to Family Unification in French and United States Immigra-
tion Law, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1988) (related Article comparing French and Amer-
ican family unification law).
2. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 878, 903 (Oct. 10, 1986). See infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),3 under which as many as
two million persons who entered illegally may become legal resi-
dents, while spouses or children of resident aliens who remained be-
hind waiting for their visas to become available are afforded no
relief.
The first section of this Article analyzes the current provisions of
immigration law affecting family unification. The second section ex-
amines the constitutionality of the numerical limitations on visa allo-
cation which impede spouses or minor children from joining a per-
manent resident alien. It concludes that family unity is such an
essential component of individual liberty that provisions of immigra-
tion law should interfere with that right no more than is necessary to
meet compelling national interests. Although the nation has compel-
ling interests in controlling the flow of immigration, analysis of the
rationale for the quantitative limitations which cause prolonged sep-
aration of immediate family members of permanent resident aliens
reveals that the national interests could be protected by means which
do not impede family unity.
The final section of the Article advocates that even if the federal
courts continue to defer to Congress in their review of immigration
laws, Congress should act to amend the current law on humanitarian
and constitutional grounds. In particular, Congress should eliminate
the numerical ceilings on entry of the spouses and minor children of
permanent resident aliens. The full text of proposed amendments is
presented in the Appendix to this Article.
FAMILY UNIFICATION PROTECTIONS IN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
LAW
Promotion of family unification, provision of refuge for the op-
pressed, and attention to labor market demands have been the prin-
cipal concerns that have shaped the selection process in American
immigration law since 1952." The relative importance of each of
these factors is partially reflected in the numbers of immigrants who
enter each year. In 1984, for example, of 544,000 total immigrants,
seventy-two percent entered because of family ties to a citizen or
permanent resident alien; seventeen percent entered with refugee sta-
tus; nine percent entered because of a skill that was needed in the
workforce; and the remaining two percent belonged to miscellaneous
3. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986) (codified in scattered titles and sections) [hereinafter IRCA]. IRCA estab-
lishes penalties for employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens and provides an
opportunity for such aliens who have resided in the country since 1982 to legalize their
status and eventually become permanent resident aliens. IRCA also provides certain ag-
ricultural workers the opportunity to obtain permanent resident status.
4. SCIRP, supra note 1, at 1.
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categories .
5
Of the nearly 400,000 family members who entered in 1984, over
forty percent were the spouses, children or parents of United States
citizens.6 These family members are exempt from any numerical
limitations. Spouses and children of permanent resident aliens,
other relatives of citizens (siblings, married children, or adult chil-
dren), and those coming to fill workforce needs, however, are se-
lected as immigrants according to a system of preference categories
and numerical limits on the number of entrants in any one year from
each nation (tables 1 and 2).
After briefly reviewing the historical development of family unifi-
cation provisions in American immigration law, this section exam-
ines in more detail the current preference system for allocating visas
and its impact on family unification for permanent resident aliens.
A Brief History of Family Unification in American Immigration
Law - Race, Sex, and Social Class as Determinants
A review of the history of American immigration law reveals nu-
merous inconsistencies and inequities in the early treatment of fam-
ily unification. The issue first arose in the context of the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 (Exclusion Act) which barred immigration of
Chinese laborers but allowed free entry of Chinese members of the
merchant class.8 Although the Exclusion Act was silent in regard to
the entry of family members, early court decisions reasoned that the
company of one's spouse and children is a "natural right" which
should not be deprived "unless the intention of Congress to do so is
clear and unmistakable." 9 These initial decisions suggested that the
right to family unification was not absolute and could be limited by
Congress. Indeed, two early United States Supreme Court decisions
upheld the deportation of Chinese wives of American citizens. 10
Since the early 1920s Congress has imposed numerical limitations
on the total number of annual immigrants and upon the number of
5. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
10-13 (1984) [hereinafter INS YEARBOOK].
6. Id.
7. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201-03, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153
(1982) [hereinafter INA]; see also infra note 26 and accompanying text.
8. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 6, 22 Stat. 58, 60.
9. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398, 400 (D. Or. 1890).
10. Yeung How v. North, 223 U.S. 705 (1911); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225
U.S. 460 (1912).
immigrants of each nationality." The 1924 Immigration Act (1924
Act) exempted the wives and the unmarried minor children of white
citizens from the ceilings imposed upon each nationality group but
afforded no preference for relatives of permanent resident aliens.12
This distinction between treatment of relatives of citizens and rela-
tives of permanent resident aliens remains fundamental in current
immigration law. Only in 1952 were the spouses of permanent resi-
dent aliens granted preference status within the quotas.'
The exemption from the immigration quotas of wives and children
of American citizens raised the question of entry of such relatives
from Asian countries. In 1925 the Supreme Court held that a Chi-
nese wife of an American citizen was precluded from entry because
of a qualitative restriction in the 1924 Act that barred immigration
of aliens "ineligible to citizenship," except under specified conditions,
none of which included relationship to an American citizen.' 4 Thus,
the 1924 Act was interpreted and applied to prohibit family unifica-
tion for American citizens or resident aliens whose spouses or chil-
dren were of Asian or other "non-white" origin.' 5
Several attempts were made in the late 1920s on behalf of Chi-
nese-Americans to amend the 1924 Act to permit the entry of rela-
tives of citizens from the Asiatic-barred zone and to ease the quota
restrictions for other categories of relatives.' The national sentiment
at the time, however, was not hospitable to easing immigration re-
strictions, and all such attempts were unsuccessful. Thus, under the
11. See Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, amended by Act of May 11,
1922, ch. 187, 42 Stat. 540. The 1924 Immigration Act (1924 Act) fixed a definite ceil-
ing of 150,000 immigrants per year and set quotas for each nationality group based on
the percentage of that group present in the country in 1890 (later, 1920). Immigration
Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
12. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 4(A), 43 Stat. at 155. Section 6(a) of
the 1924 Act provided preference within the established quotas to "the unmarried child
under 21 years of age, the father, the mother, the husband, or the wife of a citizen of the
United States who is 21 years of age or over." Id. § 6(a), 43 Stat. at 155.
13. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(27), 66 Stat. 163, 169.
Under the 1924 Act, Western Hemisphere nations (Canada, Mexico, and other indepen-
dent countries of Central and South America) were exempted from numerical limita-
tions. This remained the case until 1965 when an annual quota of 120,000 was set for the
Western Hemisphere. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. The annual
quota of 120,000 took effect in 1968 and remained in place until 1978 when a unified
world quota was established. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 201(a), 92 Stat.
907. Immigration from the continent of Asia and its adjacent islands (the Asiatic Barred
Zone) was precluded from 1917 until after World War II. See supra note 11.
14. Chang v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346, 352 (1925).
15. The Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. at 162, barred from
admission those aliens who were "ineligible to citizenship." Id. The non-white wife of an
American citizen did not qualify under any of the exceptions to this section. See also
Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924).
16. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 7089 Before the Comm. on Immigration and Nat-
uralization, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) (proposing non-quota status for husbands, chil-
dren and parents of all American citizens).
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1924 Act, the opportunity for family unification was afforded to a
few favored classes of wives and children of citizens. Not until after
World War II did significant amendments gradually expand the
range of citizens and residents entitled to family unification and the
circle of relatives who might enter to join them.
Elimination of some of the major disparities in the quota system
began in 1943 with the repeal of the Exclusion Act"7 as a gesture of
solidarity with China in the war effort. Not until 1965, however,
were Asian nations afforded annual ceilings of 20,000 immigrants,
equivalent to those of European nations.1 8 In the same year, an an-
nual ceiling of 120,000 was placed on total Western Hemisphere im-
migration. 9 Finally, in 1980, a world quota was set at 270,000 with
ceilings of 20,000 for each nation and a separate quota of 50,000 for
refugees.2 °
Family unification opportunities also were equalized and expanded
by eliminating the distinctions based on sex. Entering husbands as
well as entering wives of citizens were exempted from quota limits
and granted preference status within the quotas for spouses of per-
manent resident aliens.21
Since 1965, immigration law has specifically prohibited discrimi-
nation based on "race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of
residence."'22 This prohibition is immediately qualified, however, by a
proviso approving distinctions based on relationship to a citizen,
place of birth, or residence in allocation of visas according to the
numerical limitations.23
Today, no serious consideration would be given to a proposal to
return to racial or sexual distinctions in family unification. Immigra-
17. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. This Act repealed the Chinese
exclusion laws, making the Chinese eligible for immigration and naturalization. In 1952
the Asian ban was lifted and replaced by an overall ceiling of 2000 immigrants per year
for the entire Eastern Hemisphere. See Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 1, § 202(e), 66 Stat. at
178.
18. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
19. Western Hemisphere immigrants also were required to meet qualitative re-
quirements and obtain labor certification. Id.
20. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-57 (1982)).
21. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 1, § 203(a)(3), 66 Stat. at 178. Id. § 27(a), 66 Stat.
at 169.
22. INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
23. See INA § 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (defining "special immi-
grants;"); Id. § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (defining "immediate relatives;"); and Id. §
203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (allocating immigrant visas according to preference catego-
ries). These sections are specifically excepted from the anti-discrimination provisions.
tion law is no more above the constitutional protection of racial and
sexual equality than any other area of the law. Developments in the
recognition of individual rights in matters concerning the family also
should limit linedrawing by Congress that might cause or prolong
separation of immediate family members on the basis of national ori-
gin. The current system for visa allocation to the spouses and chil-
dren of permanent resident aliens, although greatly improved from
the earlier system, continues to operate inequitably for resident
aliens from countries of high immigration demand. The adverse im-
pact of the current visa allocation system on some families of perma-
nent resident aliens is discussed below.
The Current Preference System for Allocating Visas
Under current immigration law, certain "immediate relatives" of
American citizens (defined to include unmarried children under the
age of twenty-one, spouses, and the parents of citizens over the age
of twenty-one) may obtain immigration visas without regard to nu-
merical limitations or labor certification requirements .2 "Immediate
relatives" must not, however, be otherwise excludable under the
qualitative restrictions applicable to all entering aliens.25
Relatives of citizens other than "immediate relatives" and all rela-
tives of resident aliens must enter subject to the annual numerical
limits: 270,000 visas worldwide and 20,000 visas per nation.26 These
270,000 visas are issued within the framework of a six-tiered prefer-
ence system. Four of the six tiers allocate eighty percent of the
270,000 total preference visas on the basis of relationship to a family
member in the United States. The other two tiers allocate the re-
maining twenty percent of preference visas according to labor needs.
The chart below illustrates the allocation of visas under the six
preference categories:
24. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b). The labor certificate requirement of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) limits entry of laborers, skilled or unskilled, in situations where
sufficient workers already are available or where the employment of such aliens could
adversely affect wages and working conditions. Id. § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14).
25. Id. § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
26. Id. §§ 201, 202, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152(a).
27. Id. § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153.
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TABLE 129
Preference Category Visas Reserved Annually
1. Unmarried Sons or Daughters (over the age of twenty-one) 54,000 20%
of C itizens . .. .. .......................... ......
2. Spouses and Unmarried Sons or Daughters of Permanent 70,200 26%
R esidents . ...... .................................
3. (Certain W orkers) .................................... 27,000 10%
4. Married Sons or Daughters of Citizens .................. 27,000 10%
5. Brothers or Sisters of Adult Citizens .................... 64,800 24%
6. (Certain workers) .................................... 27,000 10%
270,000 100%
Visas are issued to eligible aliens within the six preference groups
in the order in which visa petitions are filed on their behalf.2 9 Up to
54,000 visas (twenty percent of the total number for the fiscal year)
are available to the first preference group, that is, unmarried adult
sons or daughters of citizens.30 If, as usual, the number of visas re-
served for the first preference category is greater than the demand,
unused first preference visas are added to those available for the sec-
ond preference group - spouses and unmarried sons and daughters
of permanent resident aliens. The allocation process continues simi-
larly through the remaining four preference groups except that un-
used visas, if any, from the second preference group pass to the
fourth preference group rather than to the third.31 The allocation of
28. Statistics drawn from INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 and INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153.
29. Id. § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8). This section provides that a spouse or child
may enter without the necessity of a separate visa petition and may be given the same
order of consideration as the principal immigrant. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1987). The
family members also may remain behind temporarily and later follow to join the prefer-
ence immigrant at any time after he acquires lawful residence status. See 22 C.F.R. § 1(1987). The unification problem confronts spouses or children acquired after the grant of
permanent residence to the principal alien. These relatives cannot be regarded as accom-
panying or following him or her and thus must await the availability of second prefer-
ence visas. See 6 C. GORDEN & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §
42.1 n.5 at 32-355 (1985) (reprint of Foreign Affairs Manual). Nor may relatives who
precede the preference immigrant to the United States be regarded as "accompanying or
following to join" the principal immigrant. See Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 448, 490 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
30. Since a citizen's child who is unmarried and under 21 years of age is an
"immediate family member" exempt from number limits on entry, the first preference
group includes only those unmarried sons and daughters over 21 years of age. See INA §
203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).
31. See INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
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visas for both the exempt and the preference categories of immi-
grants for 1984 is shown in Table 2 below.32
While only the second preference category promotes family unifi-
cation for permanent resident aliens, it limits entry to spouses and
unmarried sons or daughters. The quota limitations of 20,000 for
each country may require spouses and children of a permanent resi-
dent alien to wait many years before second preference visas become
available. A Mexican spouse or child, for example, must wait an es-
timated eight years after application before a visa becomes availa-
ble.33 While the immediate family members of permanent resident
aliens wait for visas, twenty-four percent of the total visas are re-
served for the siblings of citizens.34
In 1981 nearly seventy percent of the one million persons waiting
for preference visas were relatives of United States citizens or of per-
manent resident aliens.35 This backlog could be reduced partially by
eliminating the per-nation ceilings, at least for spouses and minor
children of permanent resident aliens, while retaining an overall
limit to be filled on a first-come, first-served basis. The total number
of annual preference visas also might be increased until the backlog
is absorbed.3  Unless and until these or similar suggestions are im-
plemented, the waiting list will continue to expand rapidly as a result
of IRCA.
IRCA establishes sanctions against employers who hire illegal
aliens and provides a program allowing certain aliens to attain per-
manent resident status.37 The impact of this Act on the numbers of
32. When a country has used its total allocation of 20,000 visas, in the following
year only 20% (4,000) of the visas allotted to that country may be issued to first prefer-
ence category applicants from that country, 26% (5,200) to second preference category
applicants, 10% (2,000) to third, fourth and sixth preference applicants, respectively, and
24% (4,800) to fifth preference applicants. INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(e).
33. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 878, 903 (Oct. 10, 1986). In November 1986, sec-
ond category preference visas became available to those from Mexico who applied prior
to August 1977, those from the Philippines who applied prior to October 1980, and those
from Hong Kong who applied prior to July 1979.
34. INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(2), (5). The fifth preference category, which
currently accounts for an immigration backlog of 1.5 million visa applications, has been
criticized for taking family unification too far and for leading to a potential mushroom-
ing of preference eligibility. On the other hand, the admission of siblings has been de-
fended as an integral part of the family unification concept for Italians and other ethnic
groups. See The Preference System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
(testimony of Rev. Joseph Coga).
35. SCIRP, supra note 1, at 14-15.
36. Id.
37. Under IRCA, three distinct groups of aliens may obtain permanent resident
status after a period of temporary resident status:
(1) Aliens who resided illegally in this country since before January 1, 1982.
(2) Aliens who worked at least 90 days in agriculture between May 1, 1985,
and May 1, 1986.
(3) Aliens who can prove they worked 90 days a year in United States agricul-
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persons from Mexico and Central American countries on the waiting
list for second preference visas, although difficult to estimate, will
depend upon two countervailing factors. The waiting list will be
shorter to the extent that some aliens, having lived in the United
States since January 1, 1982, will qualify for amnesty. 8 On the
other hand, the backlog will increase to the extent that clandestine
aliens, having obtained permanent resident status through the am-
nesty program, petition for entry of their immediate family mem-
bers. IRCA compounds the injustice for those who have waited in
their countries of origin for visas to become available.39
ture for the last three years and resided in the United States.
See IRCA § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a).
38. Id. There may be a considerable overlap in the categories of those who may
qualify for amnesty and those whose names are now on the visa-preference waiting list:
"85 percent are already here. When their number is called, they go back [to Mexico] to
get it and come back into the United States." 132 CONG. REC. S16889 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
39. As one Congressman expressed it,
[h]usbands, wives, and unmarried children of immigrants from Mexico have
been waiting for over 9 years to come to America . . . . and with one fell
swoop we are about to legalize all those . . . who have been here illegally re-
siding and who have preempted the legal immigration of those who are trying
to obey our laws.
132 CONG. REC. H10594 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Daub).
TABLE 240
1984 - United States Immigration By Category
Exempt Status:
Spouses, Children, and Parents





1st Unmarried Sons or Daughters of U.S. Citizens...
2nd Spouses and Unmarried Sons or Daughters of
Permanent Residents .......................
3rd Professional or Highly Skilled Workers ..........
4th Married Sons or Daughters of U.S. Citizens .....
5th Brothers or Sisters of U.S. Citizens .............
6th Needed Workers ........................
Total Preference ..................................


















CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FAMILY UNIFICATION RIGHTS OF
PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS
Neither the family nor immigration is mentioned in the United
States Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has afforded
considerable constitutional protection to the family from governmen-
tal intrusion. The Court also has identified immigration regulation as
a fundamental sovereign attribute, a responsibility of the political
branches that is almost immune from judicial control. Thus, the is-
sue of family rights in the context of immigration law mixes areas in
40. INS YEARBOOK, supra note 5, at 11-12. The figures provided in the Prefer-
ence Visas Issued column total 261,845, not 262,016. The resulting discrepency (171)
represents miscellaneous visas issued to suspension of deportation entrants (161), foreign
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which the Court has been most active on the one hand and most
deferential on the other in its exercise of judicial review of
legislation.
Constitutional Protection of Family Rights
The Supreme Court repeatedly has declared the rights of an indi-
vidual to "establish a home and bring up children" as protected
rights within the guarantees of liberty in the fourteenth amendment
due process clause.4 ' Decisions involving freedom to marry also have
been grounded in the fourteenth amendment protection of liberty.42
In determining that miscegenation statutes violate equal protection
and due process, the Court, for example, referred to the freedom to
marry as a fundamental freedom, "one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men[,] .. .one
of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence
and survival."43 Significantly, these decisions stressed not only the
aspect of individual rights but also the importance of the family to
society.44
In 1976, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,45 the Supreme Court
issued its strongest decision to date regarding the constitutional pro-
tection of family rights. In a plurality opinion, the Court relied
squarely on substantive due process in invalidating a zoning regula-
tion which interfered with the integrity of an established family
unit.46 The zoning provision, which restricted occupancy of single
family dwellings to the immediate nuclear family, had been applied
to prohibit a grandmother from living with her two grandsons.47
Clearly in Moore the burden on the family could have been charac-
terized as indirect. The city zoning did not force a dissolution of the
family unit. The family could have remained together by moving to
41. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). In each of these decisions the Court affirmed the
right of parents to assume the primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their
children.
42. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. Id. at 12.
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
45. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 496-97. The grandmother was criminally prosecuted, assessed a fine,
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for violation of the zoning ordinance that re-
stricted "family" by definition to a married couple, the couple's childless unmarried chil-
dren, and one dependent child with children.
a location in which their living arrangement would have been toler-
ated by the zoning law. Similar reasoning had been used in response
to arguments presented in immigration cases that deportation of a
family member destroyed the family unit."" In Moore, however, the
Court rejected an approach which would force the family to seek
other accommodations.49
Relying on its early decisions involving parental authority, the
Moore Court concluded that the importance of the family as the
institution through which we "inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values, moral and cultural" requires that regulations
that interfere with family integrity undergo heightened judicial scru-
tiny.5 0 Thus, the impact of the regulation on the family required an
examination of "the importance of the governmental interests ad-
vanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." 51
Since the decision in Moore, the issue of a constitutional right to
familial association also has arisen in the context of section 198352
actions seeking redress for deprivations resulting from state interfer-
ence with family relationships.53 Most courts that have considered
this issue have relied upon cases such as Moore in recognizing a con-
stitutional right to association of close family members.5 4
If "family" relationships are to be constitutionally protected from
unwarranted state interference, defining the term "family" becomes
crucial. The circle of family members who should be constitutionally
entitled to family unification under immigration law must be
identified.
Defining "Family" for Purposes of Constitutional Protection of
Family Unification
The Supreme Court has never defined "family" for purposes of
substantive due process protection. Nevertheless, the Court's deci-
sions give some guidance as to which family relationships are enti-
tled to constitutional protection from state interference. Essentially,
48. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
49. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 500.
50. Id. at 503-4.
51. Id. at 499.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
53. See generally Note, Section 1983 Actions by Family Members Based on
Deprivation of the Constitutional Right to "Family Association" Resulting from
Wrongful Death: Who has Standing?, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441 (1986).
54. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984).
See also Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985) (court recognized
that parents possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and
society of their children); Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 213 (D. Colo. 1985) (motion
to dismiss a section 1983 claim for violation of constitutional rights to family association
brought by parents whose child was killed during a struggle with police officers).
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the decisions emphasize traditional concepts of "family" - persons
bound together by marriage and kinship ties.55 Most instructive is
the Moore decision, in which the Court utilized a functional ap-
proach in finding that a grandmother filling the role of a parent is a
constitutionally protected member of the family.
In the sense that constitutionally protected family relationships
may include de facto parent-child ties, the functional approach is
expansive. On the other hand, this approach may exclude some par-
ent-child biological relationships which lack the associational ele-
ment. As the Court explained in a recent case involving a natural
father's procedural due process rights to notification of proceedings
for his child's adoption, the extent of constitutional protection of the
parent-child relationship depends upon the degree to which the par-
ent accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future."
Arguably, only parents who actually have participated in the respon-
sibilities of parenthood should benefit fr6m the constitutional protec-
tion of family unification.
Although perhaps most consistent with the reasons for affording
constitutional protection to family relationships, the functional test
presents several difficulties. First of all, analysis of the quality of the
parent-child relationship is necessarily so subjective that even-
handed administration becomes a problem. Secondly, such a test
would add a significant administrative burden to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) workload. Finally, in exclusion
cases, the immigration laws themselves may have been a barrier to
development of the parent-child bond. For these reasons, in exclusion
situations, if a parent has not lost custody of a child, the relationship
should be constitutionally protected in order to provide the opportu-
nity for the development of the emotional attachment that derives
only from the intimacy of living together as a family unit. At least in
situations in which a parent petitions for entry of a minor child, the
biological tie should be sufficient to bring the relationship within
those that are constitutionally protected. When the issue concerns
deportation of a family member, however, the constitutional signifi-
cance of the relationship may vary depending upon whether close
family ties exist. The current immigration law takes a similar ap-
proach by requiring a showing of "extreme hardship" to family
55. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); B. YORBURG, THE
CHANGING FAMILY (1973).
56. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
members who would be left behind before granting relief from an
order of deportation.5"
The problem remains one of determining whether the parent-child
tie loses constitutional significance as the child matures, and if so,
where to draw the line. If it is the child-rearing function that distin-
guishes the parent-child relationship from all others, it is reasonable
that the dependent status of the child effects the constitutional pro-
tection. Thus, as in other areas of governmental regulation, a line
may be drawn at the age of majority to limit those parent-child rela-
tionships that are protected. 8
Constitutional protection of family integrity for family ties other
than the parent-child or spousal relationship is more problematic. In
rejecting a minor sibling's claimed deprivation of a right to associa-
tion with his brother, the Seventh Circuit recently concluded that
the bond between siblings, in contrast to that between parent and
child, implicates no constitutional protection.5 9 The court noted
frankly that recognition of constitutional significance in family ties
beyond that of the parent-child relationship would preclude any
"principled way of limiting" the range of family relationships pro-
tected by the Constitution."0 In sum, in implementing a constitu-
tional right to family unification in immigration law, the parent-mi-
nor child and spousal relationships should be singled out as those
entitled to constitutional protection from state interference.
Supreme Court Response to Claims of a Constitutional Right to
Family Unification in the Context of Immigration Law
The Supreme Court's analysis in decisions reviewing immigration
law typically begins with the observation that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete. ' 61 The
most convincing explanation for judicial deference in the immigra-
tion area is the political nature of the decisions and their potential
impact on foreign relations.62 The Court, however, has invalidated
legislation involving the war power, denial of passports, and other
57. See Note, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in Suspension of Depor-
tation Cases, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 175 (1984). But see INS v. Hector, 107 S. Ct. 379
(1986) (improper to consider hardship in an aunt-niece relationship).
58. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
59. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). But see Trujillo v.
Board of City Comrnm'rs of City of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985) (recogniz-
ing constitutionally protected interest of sister in brother who died while incarcerated in
county jail).
60. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1247-48 (citing Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Supp. 359, 362(D. Colo. 1978)).
61. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)).
62. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
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matters involving foreign relations or national security.63 For exam-
ple, the Court has invalidated a statute making it a criminal offense
for employees in defense facilities to be members of the Communist
Party.6 At least when individual freedoms of Americans are at
stake, the Court has not blindly deferred to the political branches. 5
The level of scrutiny, however, has been minimal for issues involving
immigration.
Not until the 1950s were constitutional claims to family unity
squarely presented to the federal courts. These claims thus far have
been uniformly rejected with little analysis. In United States ex rel
Knauff v. Shaughnessy,"6 the Court held that immigration authori-
ties could exclude without a hearing the spouse of an American citi-
zen on unspecified grounds allegedly related to national security.
7
The Court, however, overlooked the rights of the American citizen
spouse situated in the United States.
A 1958 federal court of appeals decision was the first to directly
address whether the fifth amendment due process clause provides
protection from deportation that potentially would destroy the mar-
riage relationship. 8 Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that
deportation might burden a marriage but "would not in any way
destroy the legal union which the marriage created."69 It was enough
for the court that the wife could, if she wished, accompany her de-
ported husband. 0
In a 1975 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
an equal protection challenge to a statutory distinction between the
treatment under the preference system of aliens married to citizens
and those married to permanent resident aliens.71 The court held
that the wives, as resident aliens, had no constitutional right to keep
their alien husbands, who were awaiting visas, in this country under
a family integrity theory. The decision distinguished the line of cases
63. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (national security); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1965) (passports); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163
(1964) (passports).
64. Robel, 389 U.S. 258.
65. Id. at 264.
66. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
67. Id. at 543-44.
68. Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
69. Id. at 339. See also Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
70. Swartz, 254 F.2d at 339.
71. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1975).
establishing a fundamental right to marry on grounds that those
cases involved a more substantial interference by the state with the
right to marry.72 Additionally, the court found that the statute had a
rational and substantial relationship to the purpose for which it was
enacted - to protect the American economy by discouraging the
arrival of aliens who were coming "in large numbers and remaining
illegally in the expectation of a marriage which would assure their
continuing residence here." 73
These few decisions, along with the 1977 Supreme Court decision
in Fiallo v. Bell,"4 are the major cases analyzing the family unity
issue. They have resolved the tension between the constitutional pro-
tection of the family and the deference to the political branches in
the immigration area by upholding the limitations on family unity.
This has been accomplished only by discounting both the importance
of the individual interests involved and the extent of the interference
with the family unit.
At some point, however, the Court's deference to the political
branches must give way to the necessity of protecting fundamental
individual rights of resident aliens and citizens from unnecessary
governmental intrusion under the immigration law. As an extreme
example, a law that allowed family unification only for citizens of
the white race presumably would violate the fifth amendment both
because of the invidiousness of the classification and because of the
interference with the substantive due process rights of non-white citi-
zens and resident aliens to live a normal life.75 Likewise, the exclu-
sion of people of a particular national origin should be strictly scruti-
nized by the Court. Even if aliens outside the United States have no
cognizable claim to a violation of constitutional rights,76 American
citizens or resident aliens of the same race or national origin as those
excluded would be so stigmatized that they should have standing to
challenge such legislation. 7
Recent lower federal court decisions, including some which rely on
principles of international law in cases involving the rights of aliens
72. Id. at 1027.
73. Id. at 1029.
74. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). The Court considered a challenge to a provision of the
immigration law exempting illegitimate alien children from the numerical limitations if
they were coming to join their citizen-mothers but denying that same exemption to ille-
gitimate children wishing to join their citizen-fathers. The Court rejected equal protec-
tion claims that the statute impermissibly discriminated on the grounds of gender or that
it interfered with the right to raise one's natural children.
75. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 275, 326.
76. But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir.
1981)(recognizing the constitutional claims of alien pending determination of
admissibility).
77. Rosberg, supra note 75, at 327.
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seeking asylum and freedom from arbitrary detention, may signal a
move toward a more active review of immigration law.7 8 The Su-
preme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe7 9 also may have implications
for review of immigration legislation that impacts upon the family
unit. In invalidating state legislation denying a free public education
to undocumented alien school children, the Court reasoned that the
deprivation of education to these children would merely assure that a
percentage of our residents would remain illiterate and uneducated,
leading to grave problems in the future.8 Attention to the social im-
pact of the legislation also may be a significant factor in the review
of immigration law that affects the family.
In the family unification cases, both the individual and the societal
interests involved are at their height. The importance of these inter-
ests, and the extent to which they are harmed by immigration regu-
lations, has been discounted by the courts with the observation that
the affected family members may relocate as a unit in order to avoid
the disruption. Since the Moore decision, however, this analysis ap-
pears seriously flawed. In Moore the Court did not require the fam-
ily to move even though the relocation would have been to another
city rather than another country.'
As discussed below, the necessity (or at least the rationality) of
limitations on family unification should be examined by the Court.
Such analysis would reveal that the goals of the current numerical
limitations could be accomplished by means that do not limit the
rights of resident aliens to be joined by their spouses and minor
children.
Constitutionality of Numerical Limits on Family Unification
Many resident aliens seeking family unification are faced with
long delays before this goal is realized. Current treatment of resident
aliens who petition for entry of their spouses or minor children (sec-
ond preference category immigrants) might be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds in several respects: (1) resident aliens are treated
less favorably than citizens; (2) treatment of resident aliens varies
depending upon the national origin of the relatives seeking entry;
78. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), afid, 654
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the constitutional claims of alien pending deter-
mination of admissibility).
79. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
80. Id. at 230.
81. 431 U.S. 494 (1977); see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
and (3) the delays, in and of themselves, violate substantive constitu-
tional rights of permanent resident aliens to lead normal family lives.
The first challenge, the equal protection claim based on the dis-
tinction between citizens and permanent resident aliens, is weak. No
doubt resident aliens are protected by the Constitution.8 2 Distinc-
tions in the treatment of aliens and citizens are suspect for most pur-
poses if contained in state legislation.8 3 Such distinctions, however,
have not been treated as suspect in federal legislation where, as the
Court has noted, "a host of constitutional and statutory provisions
rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and
aliens may justify attributions and benefits for one class not accorded
to the other."84 For example, in upholding a five year residency re-
quirement for participation by aliens in the federal Medicare pro-
gram, the Court noted that Congress could decide that the strength
of claims to benefits increases over time as an alien's ties to the
country grow stronger.85 Congress also might presume that the gen-
erally stronger ties of most citizens to this country, when compared
to those of most resident aliens, justify a distinction in treatment for
purposes of family unification. In general, aliens as a class may expe-
rience less hardship in relocating to the country in which the rela-
tives reside than would citizens. Additionally, Congress could decide
that the easier access to family unification for citizens might serve as
an inducement to aliens to become citizens. Thus, the classification
would likely withstand a test of rationality, and the equal protection
challenge based on the citizen-resident dichotomy would fail.
The disparity in treatment of resident aliens based on national ori-
gin is much more difficult to justify. The individual's right to family
unification should not vary depending upon the national origin of the
spouse or minor child. Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent
resident aliens who are in like circumstances but for irrelevant and
fortuitous factors be treated in a like manner when fundamental
rights are at stake.86 The right to family unification is neither a po-
litical right dependent upon citizenship nor a mere economic right.
At issue is one of the most critical aspects of the personal liberty
82. Aliens are "persons" within the meaning of that term in the fourteenth
amendment, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), and in the fifth amend-
ment. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
83. In reviewing state classifications based on citizenship, the Court has treated
alienage as a suspect class and employed strict scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971). The Court, however, has used the rational basis test when the classifica-
tion relates to state governmental functions. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74
(1979).
84. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 n.12 (1976).
85. Id. at 80.
86. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (invalidating a distinction that
limited those who could petition for discretionary relief from deportation, INA § 212, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c), on equal protection grounds).
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interest. Though the federal government may have a legitimate in-
terest in limiting some benefits to aliens, the right to family unifica-
tion is a basic human right which should be neither denied nor ex-
cessively delayed because of the national origin of the relatives
involved. Numerous international conventions and declarations of
human rights have identified a right to protection of family life from
unnecessary state interference.87 The French Conseil d'Etat has rec-
ognized that the French Constitution affords foreign residents legally
residing in France a right to lead a normal family life, including the
right to be joined by a spouse or minor child. 8
Whether the numerical limitations violate substantive constitu-
tional rights of permanent resident aliens to lead a normal family life
depends, first of all, on the legitimacy and the importance of the
governmental objectives to be achieved. The legislative history of the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) indicates that, while
"reunification of families is to be the foremost consideration," an an-
nual quota should limit immigration "within what is believed to be
the present absorptive capacity of this country." '89 The INA also
reveals that the annual ceilings for preference category immigrants
from each nation were "designed to prevent an unreasonable alloca-
tion of visa numbers to any one foreign state."90 Therefore, immigra-
tion from countries of high demand is limited to avoid an imbalance
in the numbers of immigrants from a few nations. Thus, the major
objectives of the numerical limitations are: (1) establishment of an
overall annual limit to preference category immigration; (2) preven-
tion of monopolization of immigration visas by a few countries; and
(3) a corresponding interest in achieving cultural diversity.
The crucial issue is whether these goals justify the interference
with family unification of resident aliens whose relatives reside in
countries of high immigration demand.9 1 Not even national security
goals justify an unchecked exercise of governmental authority that
87. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, art. 16, 1948
U.N.Y.B. 446, U.N. Sales No. E.67.I.29 "The family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state."
88. Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 8, 1978, Rec. 493, Groupe d'Information et de Soutien
des Travailleurs Immigres et Autres (GISTI); 1979 Droit social 57, concl comm. govt.
Dondoux; M. LONG, P. WEIL & G. BRAIBANT, LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRU-
DENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 587 (Sirey 8th ed. 1984).
89. S. REP. No. 78, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3328, 3332.
90. Id.
91. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
curtails fundamental rights.92 When fundamental constitutional lib-
erties are at stake, Congress must achieve its goals by means that
have the least possible adverse impact on the rights involved.93 "Even
the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguard-
ing essential liberties." 4
In the family unification situation, both the national interest and
the individual interest involved are at their strongest. Rather than
determining which of the two interests is paramount, however, the
Court's inquiry should be limited to analyzing whether Congress has
adopted the least drastic means of achieving its goals.95 This requires
a test of the validity of the means adopted against both the goal
sought and the individual rights at stake.96 Prophylactic measures,
such as keeping immigration within manageable limits, should not be
achieved by means that interfere with protected rights when less in-
trusive means are available.
The goals which were the motivation for the current immigration
ceilings could be accomplished by means that do not infringe on
rights to unification with immediate family members. For example,
Congress could limit total annual immigration by establishing an
overall ceiling within which current second preference category im-
migrants would be afforded the same treatment as the spouses and
minor children of citizens. Cultural diversity could be maintained in
large part by reducing the visas available under the other five prefer-
ence categories according to the numbers of those who enter from
each nation as immediate relatives. Alternatively, Congress could
raise the ceilings for particular countries or regions in order to assure
cultural diversity, as it did for Western Europe in IRCA. 7
It is the role of Congress to determine the absorptive capacity of
the country and the overall balance to be drawn among the numbers
of workers, refugees or family members who enter as immigrants.
Judicial recognition of a constitutional right to family unification,
however, would not necessarily involve a drastic reevaluation of im-
migration policy. Only the second of the six preference categories
falls within the scope of the constitutionally protected "family." Pro-
tection of fundamental rights in this area merely would require ex-
emption of second preference category spouses and minor children
92. See, e.g., Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (First amendment right of associa-
tion protected despite important congressional goal of furthering national defense).
93. Id. at 268.
94. Id. at 264 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934)).
95. See Robel, 389 U.S. at 268.
96. Id.
97. IRCA § 314(a), 100 Stat. at 3439 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153), made avail-
able 5000 additional visas for European nations in each of the fiscal years 1987 and
1988.
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from the current numerical limits. The other five categories of the
preference system and the overall plan for immigration would re-
main essentially intact.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To THE IMMIGRATION LAW To PROTECT
FAMILY UNIFICATION
As discussed above, the purposes of the current numerical limita-
tions could be accomplished by means which less drastically intrude
upon the rights of resident aliens to be joined by their spouses and
minor children. This section outlines a proposal for legislative
amendments that would simplify the visa preference system while
protecting the constitutional right of permanent resident aliens to
family unification. The full text of these proposed amendments is
attached as an Appendix.
The crucial change suggested is that the definition in INA section
201(b)98 of "immediate relatives" exempt from numerical limits,
which currently includes the "children, spouses, and parents of a cit-
izen of the United States," be expanded to include the spouses and
minor children (under the age of eighteen) of permanent resident
aliens.9 The second major change is to revise INA section 203(a)
preference categories to provide for separate treatment of family and
worker immigration. 100 The worker ceiling, dependent as it is upon
labor market demand, should be adjusted independently from that
for family immigration.
The revised preference system would retain the four family unifi-
cation categories. The first preference category, adult unmarried
sons or daughters of citizens, would remain unchanged. The second
98. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151.
99. INA section 201(b) should be amended to read as follows with proposed
changes to the text indicated in italics:
The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall
mean (1) the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States:
[Provided, t]hat in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one
years of age, and (2) the children under eighteen years of age and spouses of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The immediate relatives
specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immi-
grants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in
this Act.
INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151. Note that a broader range of relatives of citizens than
of permanent resident aliens would remain exempt from the numerical limitations.
100. INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153. See S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1983) (proposing amendments which would divide immigrants into two broad catego-
ries: family unification immigrants and independent immigrants). See also S. 1611,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (similar proposals introduced by Senator Kennedy).
category would include only those unmarried sons and daughters of
permanent resident aliens who do not qualify for exempt status
under the proposed amendments, that is, those eighteen years of age
or older. The current third preference category for workers would be
eliminated, while the fourth preference category, married sons and
daughters of citizens, would remain unchanged. The fifth preference
category, brothers and sisters of citizens, (the category with by far
the greatest demand for visas), would be narrowed to include only
the unmarried brothers and sisters of adult United States citizens. 101
The backlog of active petitions for this category in 1983 was over
700,000 visas.' 0 2 Over half of these were for the family members of
married brothers and sisters of citizens who already had established
families of their own. 103 The narrowing of this category to unmarried
brothers and sisters would reduce considerably the backlog problem
in the future.
Congress could adjust the percentage of visas available to each
preference category. For the sake of simplicity the amendments pro-
pose that twenty-five percent of visas be reserved for each category.
The amended system for allocation of preference visas would be as
follows:
Preference Category
1. Unmarried sons and daughters (over the
age of twenty-one) of United States
citizens.
2. Unmarried sons (over the age of eighteen)
and unmarried daughters (over the age of
eighteen) of permanent resident aliens.
3. Married sons and daughters of United
States citizens.
4. Unmarried brothers and sisters of adult
United States citizens and married
brothers and sisters of United States
citizens whose visa petitions were filed
before the date of enactment.
Visa Allocations
25% of available visas plus any unused
visas from the fourth preference category.
25% of available visas plus any unused
visas from the first preference category.
25% of available visas plus any unused
visas from the first and second preference
categories.
25 % of available visas plus any unused
visas from the first, second or third
preference categories.
As indicated, unused visas in each preference category would con-
tinue to be recycled until all were consumed.
Under the current law, the number of visas issued to "immediate
relatives" is not offset against the number of visas available under
the preference categories. 0 As a result, although the world ceiling
for preference visas is set at 270,000, nearly 400,000 relatives en-
101. S. REP. No. 62, supra note 100, at 16.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Id.
104. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151.
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tered in 1984 when exempted "immediate relatives" are taken into
consideration. The proposed amendments would set a ceiling of
400,000 preference visas to be reduced by the number of "immediate
relative" visas issued in the prior year. The annual number of visas
available for the revised preference categories thus would be deter-
mined by subtracting from 400,000 the number of visas issued in the
prior year to "immediate relatives" as defined in section 201(b). 105
Therefore, any increase in the number of exempt relatives will be
offset by a reduction in the numbers of visas available for the prefer-
ence categories. For example, should more than 400,000 "immediate
relatives" enter in any one year, no preference visas would be availa-
ble in the subsequent year. This would give the immediate family
members of citizens and permanent resident aliens (those entitled to
constitutional protection) priority over more distant relatives of citi-
zens while the total of all family immigrants would be kept approxi-
mately at current levels by linking the availability of preference visas
to the demand for entry by exempt relatives. This system would pro-
tect family unification rights of citizens and permanent resident
aliens while allowing the administration a firmer control over the to-
tal number of immigrants.
While the annual ceilings for preference visas would remain at
20,000 for each country, these ceilings would be offset by the num-
ber of visas issued to "immediate relatives" admitted from that
country in the prior year. 06 No visas would be available in the pref-
erence categories for those countries from which over 20,000 "imme-
diate relatives" were admitted in the previous year.0 7 These changes
would assure cultural diversity and prevent monopolization of prefer-
105. S. REP. No. 62, supra note 100, at 16, similarly suggested reducing the num-
ber of visas available for the preference categories by the number of visas issued to "im-
mediate relatives" during the prior year. If more than 400,000 "immediate relatives"
entered in one year, no preference visas would be available in the following year.
106. Id.
107. Section 202(a) should be amended to read as follows, with proposed additions
indicated in italics and proposed deletions indicated by strikeouts:
No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the
issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or
place of residence, except as specifically provided in sections 101(a)(27), 1101(a)(27),
1151(b), and 1153, and section XXX [new categories for workers]: [Provided, t]hat the
total number of immigrant visas made available to the natives of any single foreign stat-
ute under paragraphs (I) through 7 of s tion 263(a) shall not ^. ceed ..23,30 i ay
fiscal year: 4 of section 203(a) shall be determined by subtracting from 20,000 the num-
ber of "immediate relative" visas issued to natives of the same foreign state during the
previous fiscal year....
INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152.
ence visas by particular countries while protecting family unification
rights.
CONCLUSION
A constitutional right to family unification for members of the nu-
clear family (parents and their minor children) should be recognized
and implemented in the area of immigration law. While no state has
the obligation to admit aliens into its territory, once it does admit
them as permanent residents, it must afford them basic human rights
and the full protection of the Constitution. This should include the
protection of the permanent resident alien's right to live a normal
family life. Implementation of a right to family unification would
require the removal of the numerical limitations that now impede
entry of the spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens.
While discriminatory provisions based on race, sex, social class
and legitimacy have been gradually eliminated over the course of the
last century from the family unification provisions of American im-
migration law, national origin has become a critical factor in deter-
mining the entry of immediate family members. In the absence of
compelling circumstances, however, national origin should not be a
legitimate basis for denying or excessively delaying family unifica-
tion to permanent resident aliens.
Ideally, the courts in this country should recognize and enforce a
constitutional right to family unification based on the premise that
each person admitted as a permanent resident possesses a basic
human right to live a normal family life. Any limitation of that right
should be justified only by extremely important state interests such
as the protection of national security.
While the Supreme Court has allowed the political branches
nearly unfettered discretion in controlling immigration, its line of de-
cisions protecting the family from governmental intrusions provides a
basis for the recognition of a constitutional right to family unifica-
tion. If that right were to be explicitly recognized, it would require a
more exacting standard of judicial review than currently applied to
immigration law.
Undoubtedly, implementation of a right to family unification
would have a pervasive impact. The numbers of annual entrants ini-
tially would increase for several reasons. First, the second preference
category waiting list contains the names of over 280,000 aliens who
now await visas to join spouses or parents in the United States."0 8
The right to family unification proposed in this paper would require
that these relatives be granted entry without waiting for as long as
ten years. One also could expect that many spouses or minor chil-
108. 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 399 (1984).
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dren whose names currently are not on the waiting list would request
entry should such a right be recognized. Second, those aliens who
become permanent residents through the legalization process of
IRCA also would be entitled to be joined by their spouses and minor
children, at least after the eighteen month period of temporary resi-
dence.109 Finally, the preference system allows citizens to petition for
the entry of a wide range of relatives such that the entry of each
resident alien as a spouse or minor child in turn could lead to multi-
ple petitions for entry by parents, adult brothers and sisters and their
family members when these resident aliens obtain citizenship status
after five years.
Quite simply, the base of the foreign population with a potential
for bringing in other relatives is rapidly expanding. For these rea-
sons, the recognition of a constitutional right to family unification in
the United States, especially coming on the heels of the 1986 am-
nesty provision, would significantly increase the demand for family
unification. One step that could be taken to avoid the chain reaction
in the demand for entry by family members would be to narrow the
range of relatives of citizens who now enter under the preference
categories. Limiting entry of brothers and sisters of citizens to those
who are unmarried would significantly reduce demand under that
preference category. Eventually, the scope of relatives who qualify
for entry might be reduced to those within the constitutionally pro-
tected family - spouses and minor children and those who function-
ally are members of the nuclear family unit.
109. IRCA § 303(c), 100 Stat. at 3431 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)).
APPENDIX
PROPOSED FAMILY UNIFICATION AMENDMENTS (WITH ADDITIONS
TO THE LEGISLATION INDICATED IN ITALICS AND DELETIONS
INDICATED BY STRIKEOUTS).
CHAPTER 1 - SELECTION SYSTEM NUMERICAL
LIMITATIONS
INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982):
(a) ... Exclusive of special immigrants defined in section
1101(a)(27) of this title, immediate relatives specified in subsection
(b) of this section, aftd aliens who are admitted or granted asylum
under section[s] 1157 or 1158 of this title, aliens whose status is
adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident under the legalization
provisions of section 245 (1986 amendments), and independent im-
migrants specified in section xxx (new categories for workers), the
number of aliens born in any foreign state or dependent area who
may be issued immigrant visas or who may otherwise acquire the
status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for perma-
nent residence, shall not in any of the first thr.. quarters .f any
fiseal year emeeed a total of seventy-two thousand and shall not ini
any fis.al year exe .d two hundred and seventy thousand be limited
to family unification immigrants as defined in section 1153(a) of
this title in a number not to exceed in any fiscal year the number
equal to 400,000 reduced by the number of immediate relatives as
defined in subsection (b) of this section who in the previous fiscal
year were issued an immigrant visa or who otherwise acquired the
status of lawful permanent resident ...
(b) . . . The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of
this section shall mean (1) the children, spouses, and parents of a
citizen of the United States: [Provided, t]hat in the case of parents,
such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age, and (2) the
children under eighteen years of age and spouses of an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence. The immediate relatives
specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission
as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the nu-
merical limitations in this Act.
INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152:
(a) . . . No person shall receive any preference or priority or be
discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because
of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence, ex-
cept as specifically provided in sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b), sec-
tion 201(b), and 1153 of this title, and section xxx (new categories
for workers): [Provided, t]hat the total number of immigrant visas
made available to the natives of any single foreign state under
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paragraphs (1) through 7 of s tien 203 (a) shall not exe..d 20,000
in any" fiseal -year. (4) of section 1153(a) of this title shall be deter-
mined by subtracting from 20,000 the number of "immediate rela-
tive" visas issued to natives of the same foreign state during the
previous fiscal year ...
(b) - (d) [No change.]
(e) [Delete.]
INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153:
(a) ...Aliens who are subject to the numerical limitations in
section 201(a) shall be allotted visas as follows:
(1) Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed
-M 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this
title plus any visas not required for the class specified in paragraph
(4) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are the unmarried
sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.
(2) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed
-6 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this
title, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in para-
graph (1), to qualified immigrants who are the spouses, the unmar-
ried sons eighteen years of age or over and the unmarried daughters
eighteen years of age or over of an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence.
(3) [Delete (provision for members of the professions transferred).]
(4) (3) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to ex-
ceed 4-0 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of
this title, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in
paragraphs (1).through (3)-, (1) and (2) of this subsection, to quali-
fied immigrants who are the married sons or the married daughters
of citizens of the United States.
.5) (4) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to ex-
ceed -24 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of
this title, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in
paragraphs (1) through (4) (3), to (A) qualified immigrants who are
the unmarried brothers or sisters of citizens of the United States,
provided such citizens are at least twenty-one years of age, and (B)
qualified immigrants who
(i) are married brothers or sisters of citizens of the United
States and who had received approval of a petition by reason
of such relationship prior to the effectie date of this Act, and
(ii) continue to qualify under the terms of this act as in effect
on the day before such date.
(6) [Delete. (provision for skilled and unskilled laborers).]
(-7) [Delete. (provisions for issuance of unused visas to nonpreference
immigrants).](-) (5) A spouse or child as defined in section 1101(b) (1) (A), (B),
(C), (D), or (E) of this title, shall, if not otherwise entitled to an
immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under
paragraphs (1) through (7) (4) of this subsection, be entitled to the
same status, and the same order of consideration provided in subsec-
tion (b) of this section, if accompanying, or following to join, his
spouse or parent.
(b) . . . In. considering applications for immigrant visas under
subsection (a) of this section consideration shall be given to appli-
cants in the order in which the classes of which they are members
are listed in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Immigrant visas issued pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (6)
(4) of subsection (a) of this section shall be issued to eligible immi-
grants in the order in which a petition in behalf of each such immi-
grant is filed with the Attorney General as provided in section 1154
of this title.
(d) . . . Every immigrant shall be presumed to be a nonpreference
immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular of-
ficer and the immigration officer that he is entitled to a preference
status under paragraphs (1) through (6) (4) of subsection (a) of this
section, or to a special immigrant status under section 1101(a)(27)
of this title, or that he is an immediate relative ef a United States
eitizen as specified in section 1151(b) of this title. In the case of any
alien claiming in his application for an immigrant visa to be an im-
mediate relative of a United States citizen as specified in section
1151(b) of this title or to be entitled to preference immigrant status
under paragraphs (1) through (6) (4) of subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, the consular officer shall not grant such status until he has been
authorized to do so as provided by section 1154 of this title.
(e) [No change.]
